NBCON-ALD

BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO AS A DULY CONSTITUTED ELECTORAL BOARD

Objections of: Sergio Bocanegra	)	
	)	
	)	
To the Nomination	)	No.: 11-EB-ALD-197
Papers of: Jose "Chavelo" Rodriguez	)	
	)	Related Cases: 11-EB-ALD-137,
	)	11-EB-ALD-222 and 11-EB-ALD-324
Candidate for the office of	)	
Alderman of the 12th Ward, City of Chicago	)	

FINDINGS AND DECISION

The duly constituted Electoral Board, consisting of Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago Commissioners Langdon D. Neal, Richard A. Cowen, and Marisel A. Hernandez, organized by law in response to a Call issued by Langdon D. Neal, Chairman of said Electoral Board, for the purpose of hearing and passing upon objections ("Objections") of Sergio Bocanegra ("Objector") to the nomination papers ("Nomination Papers") of Jose "Chavelo" Rodriguez, candidate for the office of Alderman of the 12th Ward of the City of Chicago ("Candidate") to be elected at the Municipal General Election to be held on February 22, 2011, having convened on December 6, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., in Room 800, 69 West Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois, and having heard and determined the Objections to the Nomination Papers in the above-entitled matter, finds that:

1. Objections to the Nomination Papers of the Candidate herein were duly and timely filed.

2. The said Electoral Board has been legally constituted according to the laws of the State of Illinois.

3. A Call to the hearing on said Objections was duly issued by the Chairman of the Electoral Board and served upon the members of the Electoral Board, the Objector and the Candidate, by registered or certified mail and by Sheriff's service, as provided by statute.

4. A public hearing held on these Objections commenced on December 6, 2010 and was continued from time to time.

5. The Electoral Board assigned this matter to Hearing Officer Ernesto D. Borges, Jr. for further hearings and proceedings.

6. The Objector and the Candidate were directed by the Electoral Board's Call served upon them to appear before the Hearing Officer on the date and at the time designated in the Hearing Schedule. The following persons, among others, were present at such hearing: the Objector, Sergio Bocanegra, by attorney Andrew Finko; the Candidate, Jose "Chavelo" Rodriguez, pro se. At subsequent hearings, the Candidate was represented by attorney, Russ Stewart.

7. The Objector further alleges that the Candidate failed to file a Statement of Financial Interest with the City of Chicago Board of Ethics pursuant to section 2-164-0-50 of the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago ("City of Chicago Campaign Financing Ordinance") and as a result, the Candidate's Nomination Papers are invalid.

8. Section 2-164-0-50 of the Municipal Code provides as follows:

> Every person who qualifies as a candidate shall thereby become a "reporting individual" for purposes of Chapter 2-156 of this code, and shall file a statement of financial interests, in the form prescribed by the Board of Ethics pursuant to said chapter, within five days after qualifying as a candidate. The provisions of Chapter 2-156 relating to time, place and manner of filing statements, delivering notices and receipts shall apply to statements of candidates. (Prior Code §26.3-5)

Section 2-164-060 of the Municipal Code provides as follows:

> No elected official shall be allowed to take the oath of office, continue in office or receive compensation from the City unless he has filed the statement of financial interest required by Section 2-164-050 and Chapter 2-156 of this code. (Prior Code §26.3-6)

9. Objector argues that because the Candidate failed to timely file a statement of financial interest, the Candidate cannot take the oath of office if elected and is, therefore, ineligible for elective municipal office in the City of Chicago.

10. Furthermore, Objector argues that, because Section 10-5 of the Illinois Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-5) requires each candidate for office to swear or affirm under oath that he or she is legally qualified to hold such office, the Candidate's Statement of Candidacy claiming that the Candidate is qualified for the office sought is false.

11. Objector's argument is based upon the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in the case of *Cinkus v the Village of Stickney Municipal Officers electoral Board*, 886 N.E.2d 1011, 228 Ill. 2d 200 (2008). In *Cinkus*, a candidate, John Cinkus sought to run for village trustee. After Cinkus filed his nominating papers, he received notice by way of an objection that he owed a debt to the village in the amount of $100. The objection alleged that Section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5) precluded Cinkus from running for office because he was in violation of said section. Sec. 3.1-10-5(b) provides that:

> (b) A person is not eligible for an elective municipal office if that person is in arrears in the payment of a tax or other indebtedness due to the municipality or has been convicted in any court located in the United States of any infamous crime, bribery, perjury, or other felony.

Cinkus then paid or attempted to pay the debt with the village. The electoral board removed Cinkus from the ballot and the matter ultimately went to the Illinois Supreme Court wherein the Court addressed the question of whether a violation of the Illinois Municipal Code's arrearage

prohibition, read in conjunction with the statement of candidacy provisions of Section 10-5 of the Election Code, bars a candidate from the ballot. The Supreme Court determined that

> ...reading these two statutes together, the disqualifications provided by section 3.1 - 10 - 5 (b) of the Illinois Municipal Code renders a candidate ineligible to run for office if not remedied by the time the candidate files his or her nomination papers. 886 N. E. 2d 1023.

The import of *Cinkus* is that it was the first case to hold that an arrearage to a village not only precludes a person from taking office, but it also precludes a person from running for office.

12. The question presented to this Electoral Board is whether the City of Chicago Campaign Financing Ordinance imposes eligibility restrictions on candidates running for elective municipal office in the City of Chicago and, if so, whether they are enforceable by electoral boards by virtue of the case of *Cinkus v the Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board*, 886 N.E.2d 1011, 228 Ill. 2d 200 (2008).

13. While the *Cinkus* is clear that eligibility restrictions contained in the Illinois Municipal Code may bar a person's candidacy, the City of Chicago's Campaign Financing Ordinance has no similar effect.

14. It is argued that Section 21-35 of Article 20 of the Illinois Municipal Code (otherwise knows as the "Revised Cities and Villages Act") (65 ILCS 20/21-35) allows the Chicago City Council to enact eligibility requirements for elective municipal office in the City of Chicago. Section 21-35 provides that "all laws in force in the city of Chicago governing elections for municipal offices or applicable thereto and not inconsistent with the provisions of this article, shall apply to and govern all elections held under the terms of this article." Municipal ordinances, the argument goes, are intended to be included in the above cited phrase "all laws in force ...." It is also argued that Section 21-22 of Article 21 of the Illinois Municipal Code similarly empowers the City Council to enact eligibility requirements for its elected

officers by providing in part, "All elections for aldermen shall be in accordance with the provisions of law in force and operative in the City of Chicago for such elections at the time the elections are held." (65 ILCS 20/21-22) Objector would read into these statutes the authority of municipalities to enact, by municipal ordinance, additional eligibility requirements for election to an office created by state statute. However, no case has ever held that these provisions referring to "all laws in force" were intended to include municipal ordinances. More likely, this section is an outgrowth of Sections 3.1-5-5 ("This Article 3.1 applies to all officers elected or appointed under this Article and Articles 4 and 5, unless provided otherwise.") and 3.1-10-10 (" The general election law applies to the scheduling, manner of conducting, voting at, and contesting of municipal elections.") of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1-5-5 and 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-10). The "general election law" referred to in Section 3.1-10-10 of the Illinois Municipal Code of course means the "general election law" found in the Illinois Election Code. See, Section 1-1 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/1-1) ("This Act is the general election law of Illinois and any reference in any other Act to 'the general election law' or the 'the general election law of this State' is a reference to this Act, as now or hereafter amended."). The Election Code and Article 3.1 of the Illinois Municipal Code are the laws that govern elections in the City of Chicago, except where they are inconsistent with the express provisions of Article 21 of the Illinois Municipal Code. See, e.g., *Robinson v. Jones*, 186 Ill.App.3d 82, 542 N.E.2d 127 (First Dist. 1989); *United Citizens v. Coalition*, 125 Ill.2d 332, 531 N.E.2d 802 (1988) (reconciling the Election Code and the Illinois Municipal Code). Except for cases addressing the exercise of home rule powers through referendum, not a single election case has been cited for the proposition that a municipality can, through ordinance, create ballot access barriers for candidates seeking elective municipal office.

15. Illinois courts have held, for instance, that where the Constitution undertakes to prescribe qualifications for office, its declaration is conclusive of the whole matter. *Thies v. State Bd. of Elections,* 124 Ill.2d 317, 325, 529 N.E.2d 565, 569 (1988). The legislature is without authority to change or add to the qualifications unless the Constitution gives it the power. *Cusack v. Howlett* (1969), 44 Ill.2d 233, 242-43, 254 N.E.2d 506. The same principle, it seems, applies to offices created by the legislature. Where an office is created by statute, it is wholly within the power of the Legislature creating it. For example, the length of term and mode of appointment may be altered at pleasure by the legislature, and the office may be abolished altogether. *People ex rel. Hoyne v. McCormick*, 261 Ill. 413, 421, 103 N.E. 1053, 1057 (1913).

16. While a municipality may provide for its officers, their manner of selection and terms of office, they may do so only acting through home rule power, subject to referendum.

17. The Illinois Attorney General has taken up this question in various opinions, the most relevant being Attorney General Opinion 00-003 dated March 7, 2000. In that opinion, Attorney General Jim Ryan was faced with the question of whether a home rule municipality has the authority to lengthen the statutory durational residency requirement for candidates running in the municipality. The Attorney General first looked to article VII, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 which provides in pertinent part:

> (f) A home rule unit shall have the power subject to approval by referendum to adopt, alter or repeal a form of government provide by law...A home rule municipality shall have the power to provide its officers, their manner of selection and terms of office only as approved by referendum or as otherwise authorized by law.

The Attorney General determined that the durational residency requirement of municipal officers is a provision relating to the manner of selection of those officers, for purposes of article VII, section 6 of the Constitution, and that the establishment of qualifications for

public office is a key component of the manner in which elected officers are selected.

Accordingly, the Attorney General determined that:

> the statutory qualifications for office established by statute may be altered by a referendum adopted in a home rule municipality pursuant to article VII, section 6 of the Constitution." (page 5) Emphasis added.

Attorney General Lisa Madigan had the opportunity to address a similar issue. In Attorney General Opinion 05-007 dated September 7, 2005, Attorney General Madigan took up the question of whether home rule municipalities may, by referendum, implement election systems, such as cumulative voting or instant run-off voting, that are not specifically authorized by the Election Code or the Illinois Municipal Code. She determined that

> "pursuant to article VII, section of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, a home rule municipality had such authority subject to referendum approval, to adopt procedures for selecting municipal officers that differ from those set forth in either the Election Code or the Municipal Code." (page 1) Emphasis added.

Attorney General Madigan further recognized that

> [a]lthough they have been granted extensive powers with respect to their local government and affairs (Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, Sec.(a), home rule municipalities may change their manner of selection of officers only: (1) as provided by statute; or (2) as approved by a referendum. See *Leck v Michaelson*, 111 Ill .2d 523, 528 (1986); *Clarke v Village of Arlington Heights*, 57 Ill. 2d 50, 54 (1974).

Attorneys General Ryan and Madigan have made clear that (a) a home rule unit's change in the qualifications for office is a change in the manner of selection of officers and that (b) such a change must be accomplished by referendum.

18. Applying these Attorneys General opinions and the cases they cite to the instant question of whether a violation of the City of Chicago Financing Ordinance affects a candidate's

eligibility to be on the ballot for elective municipal office, the answer is that such a violation cannot act as a bar to the ballot.

19. The City of Chicago Financing Ordinance clearly seeks to change the qualifications for office of candidates running for municipal office in the City of Chicago. However, the ordinance was not approved by a referendum as required by Article VII, sec. 6 of the Illinois Constitution. Absent a referendum, the City is without authority to enact binding changes to the selection of its officers.

20. Because the ordinance was not enacted via referendum, it is not necessary to reach the question of whether this Electoral Board has jurisdiction to address violations of the City of Chicago Financing Ordinance. However, even if such a question was now before the Electoral Board, it is clear from Section 2-164-170(a) of the Chicago Municipal Code that jurisdiction rests with the City of Chicago Board of Ethics, not with this Electoral Board. Section 2-164-170(a) of the ordinance provides, as follows:

> 2-164-170 Powers and Duties of Board in Regard to Campaign Financing Ordinance. In addition to the other powers and duties conferred on it by this Code, the Board of Ethics shall have the following powers and duties:
>
> (a) To initiate and to receive complaints of violations of any of the provisions of this chapter and to investigate and act upon such complaints as provided by this chapter; provided, however, that the Board shall have no authority to investigate any complaint alleging a violation of any provision of this ordinance or alleging other misconduct by an alderman. If the Board receives a complaint alleging a violation or other misconduct by an alderman, the Board shall, within two days after receipt thereof, transmit such complaint to the standing committee of the City Council having jurisdiction over such complaints.

21. As the foregoing provision indicates, the Board of Ethics – not the Board of Election Commissioners – has the power and duty over violations of *any provisions of this chapter* with the exception of violations involving incumbent alderman. It is significant to note

that the provision carves out a jurisdictional exception for alderman but not for candidates. Accordingly, it must be concluded that the Board of Ethics would be the proper entity to address a candidate's failure to comply with the Ordinance.

22. The Objector further alleges that the Candidate's Nomination Papers are invalid because they were not securely fastened as required by Section 10-4 of the Election Code.

23. The Hearing Officer found that a review of the picture of the Candidate's Nomination Papers when they were filed revealed that they were secured with a large metal binding clip and not a paper clip as the Objector alleges.

24. Section 10-4 provides that petition sheets shall be neatly fastened together in book form, by placing the sheets in a pile and fastening them together at one edge in a secure and suitable manner, and the sheets shall then be numbered consecutively. Section 10-4 further provides that noncompliance with its provisions "shall" invalidate the signatures on a nominating petition. Specifically, the Code states: "No signature shall be valid or be counted in considering the validity or sufficiency of such petition unless the requirements of this Section are complied with." Based upon that language which imposes sanctions in the event the provisions of the Code are not complied with, coupled with the use of the word "shall," the requirements of section 10-4 are mandatory rather than directory. *Bendell v. Education Officers Electoral Board for School Dist. 148*, 338 Ill.App.3d 458, 463, 788 N.E.2d 173 (1st Dist. 2003). "Inasmuch as section 10-4 is mandatory, compliance with its provisions must be strict rather than substantial." (*Id.*) In *Bendell*, the evidence was that candidate's 6 to 8 nominating papers were fastened together along one edge by a large paper clip and formed a single series of uniform leaves. The court concluded that candidate's nominating papers were in "book form," and, therefore, in strict compliance with the Code.

> "The uncontroverted evidence is that they were securely fastened because a member of the Board was unable to pull them apart without removing the paper clip. This is a fact-specific case. Obviously, if the record established that the nominating papers were not securely fastened or if they had consisted of 500 pages, for example, and were held together by a single, large paper clip, our decision would be different. However, given the fact that there were only 6 to 8 pages which could not be separated without removing the paper clip, and given the fact that this particular binding did not interfere with preserving the integrity of the petitions and the election process generally, plaintiff's nominating petitions strictly complied with section 10-4. For that reason, we affirm the order of the circuit court. We realize that the trial court held that plaintiff had substantially, not strictly, complied with section 10-4. However, we may affirm on any basis appearing in the record.

Bendell, 338 Ill.App.3d at 464.

25. But see *Girot v. Keith*, 341 Ill.App.3d 902, 904, 793 N.E.2d 935, 937 (3rd Dist. 2003), reversed on other grounds, 212 Ill.2d 372, 818 N.E.2d 1232 (2004), where the Third District reached a far different conclusion, stating that "The purpose of requiring candidates to securely bind and number the petitions is to prevent tampering, thereby preserving not only the integrity of the petitions submitted, but also the election process in general," citing *Jones v. Dodendorf*, 190 Ill.App.3d 557, 562, 546 N.E.2d 92 (1989). The court found that these provisions are mandatory, and that failing to comply with even one of them will result in the petitions' invalidation. Where petition pages were merely paper clipped together, the court found that it could not find that the paper clip was a "secure" fastener for the purposes of section 10-4 of the Code. "By its very nature, a paper clip allows the papers it 'fastens' to be pulled apart and rearranged at will, showing no sign of tampering and doing little to assure the continued integrity of the petition package submitted to the electoral official." In regard to the candidate's contention that clipping the pages together amounted to "substantial compliance" under the statute, the court noted that "Courts have found substantial compliance where a candidate attempted to follow the requirements of the statute, but inadvertently failed to meet them fully."

341 Ill.App.3d at 904-905. "There may also be substantial compliance if the purposes for the requirement are satisfied by the candidate's actions." Id.

26. In the instant case, the Hearing Officer concluded that the Candidate's Nomination Papers were fastened in a single pile, at one edge, and in a secure and suitable manner as required by Section 10-4 of the Election Code.

27. The Objector further alleges that the Candidate's Statement of Candidacy was defective because it contains a reference to party affiliation.

28. Candidate's statement of candidacy for Alderman indicated that he was seeking the nomination of the "Democratic Party." The words "Democratic Party" did not appear on his nominating petitions. Aldermanic candidates are nonpartisan and no political party affiliation is allowed on the ballot. (65 20/21-32) Because the words "Democratic Party" were not on the candidate's petition sheets when they were presented to the voters for signature, there was no misleading or incorrect information concerning party affiliation presented to the voters when signing the candidate's petition sheets. There is no evidence that the voters were confused about the candidate's stated or unstated political affiliations. Under these facts, there is not enough to invalidate the candidate's statement of candidacy simply because it contained extraneous information concerning the candidate's political party affiliation were none was required. *Dix v. Terry*, 03-EB-ALD-071, CBEC, January 31, 2003.

29. The Hearing Officer has tendered to the Electoral Board his report and recommended decision. The Hearing Officer recommends that the Objections to the Candidate's Nomination Papers be overruled and that the Nomination Papers be declared valid.

30. The Electoral Board, having reviewed the record of proceedings in this matter and having considered the report and recommendations of the Hearing Officer, as well as all

argument and evidence submitted by the parties, hereby adopts the Hearing Officer's recommended findings and conclusions of law. A copy of the Hearing Officer report and recommendations is attached hereto and is incorporated herein as part of the decision of the Electoral Board.

31. For the reasons stated above, the Electoral Board overrules the Objections to the Candidate's Nomination Papers and finds that the Candidate's Nomination Papers are valid.

32. The Electoral Board further finds that additional objections were filed against the Candidate's Nomination Papers in Related Cases: 11-EB-ALD-137, 11-EB-ALD-222 and 11-EB-ALD-324 and the Candidate's Nomination Papers were also deemed valid in said cases.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Objections of Sergio Bocanegra to the Nomination Papers of Jose "Chavelo" Rodriguez, candidate for election to the office of Alderman of the 12th Ward of the City of Chicago, are hereby OVERRULED and said Nomination Papers are hereby declared VALID and the name of Jose "Chavelo" Rodriguez, candidate for election to the office of Alderman of the 12th Ward of the City of Chicago, SHALL be printed on the official ballot for the Municipal General Election to be held on February 22, 2011.

Dated: Chicago, Illinois, on January 18, 2011.

Langdon D. Neal, Chairman

Richard A. Cowen, Commissioner

Marisel A. Hernandez, Commissioner

NOTICE: Pursuant to Section 10-10.1 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-10.1) a party aggrieved of this decision and seeking judicial review of this decision must file a petition for judicial review with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County within 5 days after service of the decision of the Electoral Board.

BEFORE THE DULY CONSTITUTED ELECTORAL BOARD FOR THE HEARING AND PASSING UPON OF OBJECTIONS TO THE NOMINATING PETTITIONS OF CANDIDATES FOR THE FEBRUARY 22, 2011, MUNICIPAL GENERAL ELECTION FOR MAYOR, CLERK, TREASURER AND ALDERMAN IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO

SERGIO BOCANEGRA,	}		
	}		
Objector	}		
	}		
v.	}	11 EB-ALD-197	
	}		
JOSE "CHAVERLO" RODRIGUEZ	}	Related to:	11 EB-ALD-137
	}		11 EB-ALD-222
Candidate	}		11 EB-ALD-324

HEARING OFFICER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DECISION

I. Case History

This matter first came before the Hearing Officer on December 6, 2010, at which date it came on for hearing, with objector appearing through counsel and Candidate appearing *pro se*. Attorney Andrew Finko appeared on behalf of Objector.

Candidate was granted a series of continuances in order to retain counsel. Attorney Russ Stewart appeared on behalf of Candidate.

The matter was called for hearing on December 22, 2010. Objector alleged three violations by Candidate: 1) Candidate failed to timely file a Statement of Financial Interest as required by the Chicago Campaign Finance Ordinance; 2) The Nomination Papers were not securely fastened as required by Section 10-4 of the Illinois Election Code; and 3) the Statement of Candidacy was defective.

1. Statement of Financial Interest

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The Chicago Campaign Financing Ordinance requires that such a statement be submitted within 5 days of the filing of the Nomination Papers. Objector also alleged that the Nomination Papers submitted by Candidate violated Section 10-4

A determination of whether Candidate complied with the Ordinance is not necessary. The Board of Elections Commissioners in *Stroud v. Anderson*, 11 EB-ALD-292, issued December 29, 2010, held that the Board of Elections does not have jurisdiction to hear objections alleging violations of the Chicago Campaign Financing Ordinance by non-incumbent candidates (paragraph 19).

The Board identified that the Chicago Public Financing Ordinance established additional selection criteria for candidates for municipal office. Those additional eligibility requirements may not be enforced by the Electoral Board.

Eligibility requirements for election to municipal office could only be amended by the state legislature or by a municipal ordinance approved via referendum under the home rule power (paragraph 20). Because the Chicago Campaign Finance Ordinance was neither enacted by the state legislature nor approved by referendum, "the City is without authority to enact binding changes to the selection of its officers" (paragraph 18).

The Board acknowledged it's authority to hear cases arising from violations of the Illinois Municipal Code and the Illinois Election Code.

The Board specifically distinguished the decision by the Illinois Supreme Court in *Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board*, 886 N.E.2d 1011, 228 Ill.2d 200 (2008).

In that case, the candidate was denied a spot on the ballot because he had an outstanding debt owed to the village at the time his nomination papers were filed. The court held that the

Illinois Municipal Code Section 3.1-10-5(b) (declaring ineligible for election to municipal office any person owing a debt to the municipality) read with Section 10-5 of the Illinois Election Code barred any person in violation of the Municipal Code's filing requirements both from running for office and from taking office.

The decision in *Cinkus* does not provide "authority for the proposition that a municipality may enact additional eligibility requirements of its own (at least not in the absence of home rule power exercised and approved by referendum) to bar candidates from the ballot" (paragraph 20).

2. The Nomination Papers Were Not Securely Fastened

Objector contended that the Nomination Papers were defective because they were not securely fastened. Section 10-4 requires the petition sheets to be neatly fastened together in book form, by placing the sheets in a pile and fastening them together at one edge in a secure and suitable manner. Noncompliance invalidates the signatures contained within.

Objector argued that the Papers were fastened with a paper clip thereby not being bound in a safe and secure manner. The decision in *Bendell v. Education Officers E.B. for School Dist. 148*, Ill.App3d 458, 463, 788 N.E.2d 173 (1st Dist. 2003) requires that compliance with the provisions of 10-4 be "strict rather than substantial."

Upon review of the photograph taken of the Nomination Papers immediately following their submission, it is apparent that a large metal binding clip, not a single "paper clip," was used to secure the Papers. A visual inspection reveals that all the requirements of Sec. 10-4 have been met. Furthermore, the Board has previously held that binding the Papers with large clips and/or paper clips at the top center of the packet substantially complies with the requirements

established in *Bendell. Hayes v. Anderson, 07-EB-ALD-017,* CBEC, January 12, 2007; *Hayes v. Pritchett, 07-EB-ALD-20,* CBEC, January 16, 2007.

3. Statement of Candidacy

The Objector alleged that the Candidate's Statement of Candidacy was defective because it identifies the Candidate as belonging to the Democratic party. This renders the Nomination Papers invalid because the election is non-partisan.

Candidate responded by arguing that listing a Democratic Party affiliation on the Statement of Candidacy was a good faith error. Such an error was cured. There was no party affiliation indicated anywhere on the petition sheets thus minimizing any exposure to potential supports of such affiliation.

II. Findings of Fact and Law

The Statement of Financial Interest filing requirement is an eligibility restriction enacted by the Chicago Campaign Finance Ordinance.

The Chicago Campaign Finance Ordinance was not approved by referendum as required by Article VII, sec. 6 of the Illinois Constitution.

The Electoral Board does not have jurisdiction to hear objections relying on eligibility restrictions enacted by the Chicago Campaign Finance Ordinance.


The Nomination Papers were fastened in a single pile, at one edge, and in a secure and suitable manner.

The Statement of Candidacy's defect was cured by using petition signature sheets which contained no references to any party affiliation.

III. Recommendations

Taking into account the above-mentioned factual findings, it is the recommendation of the hearing Officer that the Board adopt the findings validating the Nomination Papers of the Candidate Jose "Chavelo" Rodriguez. It is recommended to the Board that the Candidate's name appear on the ballot for election to the office of Alderman of the 12th Ward, City of Chicago, to be voted upon at the February 22, 2011 Municipal General Election for Mayor, Clerk, Treasurer and Alderman.

Respectfully Submitted,



January 10, 2011

Ernesto Borges, Jr.
Hearing Officer